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The concepts of  attitude and evaluation have been 
central to social psychology for nearly a century. This 
should not be surprising, as the ubiquitous act of  assign-
ing positive or negative valence is crucial for survival, be 
it in guiding immediate behavior toward or away from 
an object, or in anticipation of  future rewards or punish-
ments. Through accumulated experience, these evalua-
tive judgments can be consolidated in memory to form a 
summary attitude, which can be recalled to guide future 
behavior. These summary attitudes, though imperfect 
at times, allow for the construction of  quick evaluative 
judgments when similar stimuli or situations occur. For 
example, once we learn that someone is untrustworthy, 
we can avoid that person in future situations without 
needing to re-evaluate all of  our previous interactions 
with the individual. Thus, attitudes enable us to predict 
the value of  objects and the behavior of  others, allowing 
us to adapt to the world through experience and make 
advantageous decisions. 
In this chapter, we review social neuroscience re-
search that links social psychological attitudes and eval-
uative processes to their presumed neural bases. The 
chapter is organized into four parts. In the first section, 
we discuss how attitude representations are transformed 
into evaluative states that can be used to guide thought 
and action. In the next two sections, we address the re-
lated processes of  attitude formation and change. In the 
last section, we discuss applications of  these concepts 
for the study of  prejudice and political behavior. 
 
Attitude Expression 
 
The processes of  attitude expression involve the trans-
lation of  attitudinal representations into an active evalu-
ation that can be used to inform thoughts and behavior 
(see Cunningham & Zelazo, 2007). Whereas an attitude 
refers to a relatively stable set of  representations (only 
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some of  which may be active at any time), an evaluation 
reflects the current processing state of  the evaluative sys-
tem (which is determined by the aspects of  the attitude 
that are currently active). Evaluative processes help de-
termine the motivational significance of  a stimulus as 
well as its expected reward or punishment value. In or-
der to do so, these processes draw upon pre- existing at-
titudes, as well as novel information about the stimulus, 
contextual information, and current goal states. Evalu-
ative states arise out of  dynamic interactions between 
these elements. Encountered or imagined stimuli (e.g., 
people, objects, or abstract concepts) elicit relatively au-
tomatic evaluations, but these initial “gut reactions” 
can be modulated by an increasing number of  higher-
level cognitive and reflective processes (Cunningham & 
Zelazo, 2007). These higher-order reflective processes 
send information back to the lower-order processes, al-
lowing for a re-evaluation of  the affective response and, 
if  necessary, a different affective interpretation of  the 
same stimuli. This allows for the foregrounding of  more 
relevant and congruent affective representations and the 
backgrounding of  irrelevant or incongruent contextual 
information in order to achieve a more nuanced evalu-
ation congruent with the current context and/or goals. 
When considering the brain regions involved in gen-
erating these evaluative predictions, the amygdala has 
received the most attention. Ever since the classic work 
of  Kluver and Bucy (1937; see also Weiskrantz, 1956) 
demonstrated that lesions to the temporal lobes led to 
a decrease in avoidance of  potentially threatening stim-
uli, a common frame- work for understanding amygdala 
function has been fear detection and conditioning (see 
next section). Research using functional magnetic res-
onance imaging (fMRI) in humans has shown that the 
amygdala is involved in the detection of  threat in many 
stimulus modalities, including the perception of  visual 
facial expressions of  fear (Adolphs et al., 1999; Calder, 
Keane, Manes, Antoun, & Young, 2000; Morris et al., 
1998), cognitive representations of  fear (Phelps et al., 
2001), threat-related words (Isenberg et al., 1999), and 
aversive odors (Zald & Pardo, 1997). Given this body of  
research, Freese and Amaral (2009) have suggested that 
the amygdala detects danger and then automatically di-
rects behavioral responses. 
An examination of  the anatomic connections with 
the amygdala suggests that this region is well suited for 
automatic vigilance and organized response functions 
(Davis & Whalen, 2001). Specifically, the amygdala 
has widespread connections to areas associated with 
perceptual processing and autonomic/ visceral activa-
tion (see Freese & Amaral, 2009, for a review). Thus, 
following amygdala activation, greater attention can be 
directed to the stimulus while the body prepares for im-
mediate action. Furthermore, the amygdala has multi-
ple connections to areas of  prefrontal cortex (Aggleton, 
Burton, & Passingham, 1980), receiving from and relay-
ing information to areas of  orbitofrontal, insular, and 
lateral prefrontal cortices (Amaral & Price, 1984; Stefa-
nacci & Amaral, 2000). These connections allow infor-
mation processed in the amygdala to be used by regions 
involved in more deliberate forms of  decision-making. 
Through reciprocal connections, amygdala activation 
can be modulated to take into consideration the entire 
state of  the organism. Thus, following amygdala acti-
vation, multiple brain systems are dynamically reorga-
nized (or given the opportunity to reorganize) to appro-
priately deal with the current environment. 
One critical aspect of  amygdala function concerns 
the speed at which it can evaluate the rapid stream of  
incoming information. Many models of  amygdala func-
tion suggest that it operates relatively automatically and 
unconsciously, and current research has provided sup-
port for this idea. For example, conscious awareness of  
a valenced stimulus does not appear to be necessary to 
produce amygdala activation. In a conceptual replica-
tion of  previous research on supraliminal face process-
ing (Morris et al., 1996), Whalen and colleagues (1998) 
demonstrated that subliminal presentations of  emotion-
ally fearful faces led to amygdala activation. In addition, 
Morris, Öhman, and Dolan (1998) found that after par-
ticipants were classically conditioned to associate par-
ticular angry faces with an aversive stimulus, the amyg-
dala showed greater activity to these conditioned faces 
than to the control faces, using both subliminal and su-
praliminal presentations. Using depth electrodes, Ka-
wasaki and colleagues (2001) found that the processing 
of  valence (greater neural firing to valenced as opposed 
to neutral stimuli) occurred 200 milliseconds after stim-
ulus presentation in single-cell recordings of  the hu-
man amygdala. Taken together, these studies indicate 
that the human amygdala responds rapidly to valenced 
stimuli, even when they are presented outside conscious 
awareness. 
However, the suggestion that the amygdala’s role in 
evaluation is valence specific has been called into ques-
tion. Specifically, several studies have since shown that 
the amygdala is sensitive not only to fearful or negative 
information, but also to positive information (Hamann, 
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Ely, Hoffman, & Kilts, 2002; Hamann & Mao, 2002; 
Garavan et al., 2001; Liberzon et al., 2003), leading to 
at least two competing theoretical positions. First, it is 
possible that the amygdala provides evaluative informa-
tion about both positive and negative stimuli. According 
to this view, the amygdala is active whenever generating 
both positive or negative evaluations. Alternatively, amyg-
dala activation may reflect some process associated with 
evaluative processing other than valence, such as stimulus 
intensity or arousal. Hamann and colleagues (2002) rep-
licated the finding that the amygdala responds not only 
to positive and negative stimuli, but also to unusual or 
interesting stimuli, suggesting that it serves a more gen-
eral function than just processing valence. Further, stud-
ies that have independently manipulated valence and in-
tensity (Anderson et al., 2003; Small et al., 2003), or used 
statistical methods to separate the contributions of  the 
two (Cunningham, Raye, & Johnson, 2004), have pro-
vided evidence that amygdala activity appears to be asso-
ciated more with processing affective intensity than with 
processing any particular valence. Consistent with this 
idea, patients with bilateral amygdala damage have im-
paired recognition of  emotional arousal, while recogni-
tion of  valence remains intact (Adolphs, Russell, & Tra-
nel, 1999; see Berntson, Bechara, Damasio, Tranel, & 
Cacioppo, 2007 for a more nuanced perspective). 
One explanation for these findings has been to sug-
gest that amygdala activation may reflect the processing 
of  motivationally relevant stimuli, perhaps recruiting 
additional resources to facilitate appropriate interac-
tions with the stimulus (e.g., Sander, Grafman, & Zalla, 
2003). According to this view, a primary early function 
of  attitudes is to inform us about what is important in 
any particular situation — then modulate the appropri-
ate second-order perceptual, attentional, autonomic, or 
cogni- tive/conceptual processes that allow us to deal 
with the challenges or opportunities that are present. If  
this is the case, then amygdala activation should vary as 
a function of  the goals of  the organism. 
To examine the motivational flexibility of  and top-
down influences on amygdala activation, Cunning-
ham, Raye, and Johnson (2005) presented participants 
with positively and negatively valenced stimuli during 
fMRI scanning. After scanning, participants completed 
an individual differences measure of  their prevention—
and promotion—focus orientation (i.e., participants in-
dicated whether they were more motivated by negative 
or positive stimuli, respectively; Higgins, 1997). Consis-
tent with this idea, among participants who were more 
promotion focused, greater activation was observed in 
the amygdala, anterior cingulate gyrus, and extrastriate 
cortex for positive stimuli. For more prevention-focused 
participants, greater activation was observed in these 
same regions for negative stimuli. 
In addition, a recent experimental study has provided 
evidence that situational motives shape amygdala pro-
cessing in a dynamic fashion (Cunningham, Van Bavel, & 
Johnsen, 2008). In this study, participants were presented 
with famous names and asked to focus on either the pos-
itive or negative aspects of  the person (e.g., ignoring ev-
erything bad, how good is this person?). Activity in bilat-
eral amygdala and insula was found to vary as a function 
of  evaluative fit. That is, when focusing on negativity, 
greater amygdala and insula activity was associated with 
participants’ negativity ratings of  the names, but not pos-
itivity ratings (recorded after scanning). The opposite pat-
tern was found for the positive-focus condition, such that 
greater activity was observed in these same regions to rat-
ings of  positivity than negativity. Taken together, these 
studies suggest that chronic and situational motivational 
concerns can modulate the processing of  valenced infor-
mation to generate situationally appropriate evaluations. 
These studies demonstrate the power of  top-down pro-
cesses to modulate lower-order processes and provide a 
new understanding of  amygdala function. 
 
Beyond the Amygdala 
 
Although most attention has been directed toward 
the amygdala, evaluative processes are associated with a 
much larger circuit involving additional cortical and sub-
cortical regions. Among the more critical subcortical re-
gions associated with evaluation is the ventral striatum, 
and more specifically the nucleus accumbens (NAcc). 
Linking NAcc activity to evaluation more closely, stud-
ies of  economic decision making have shown that NAcc 
activity is not only correlated with, but is even some-
times a better predictor of, a participant’s choice to buy 
a particular product than is self-report (Knutson et al, 
2007). 1 Critically, whereas the amygdala activation ap-
pears to be associated with the evaluation of  both posi-
tive and negative stimuli, the NAcc is primarily involved 
in the anticipation of  positive outcomes and/or receipt 
of  incentives or rewards (Breiter, Aharon, & Kahneman, 
2001; Cardinal et al., 2002; Knutson et al., 2001). That 
is, while the amygdala may not be valence specific, the 
NAcc may allow for dissociated representations of  posi-
tive and negative evaluation (see Cacioppo & Berntson, 
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1994 for a detailed review of  evidence of  dissociated 
processing of  positive and negative valence). 
Whereas activity in the amygdala has been shown to 
play a role in directing attention towards motivationally 
significant stimuli and automatically preparing for be-
havior, little evidence has been found to suggest that this 
activation leads to the experience of  subjective prefer-
ence. That is, although activation in the amygdala is cor-
related with objective attitude ratings (Cunningham et 
al., 2003, 2004), the actual subjective pleasantness asso-
ciated with receiving (or displeasure associated with not 
receiving) an expected outcome is correlated with acti-
vation in orbitofrontal cortex (OFC; Kringelbach, 2005). 
Orbitofrontal cortex activity is evident for primary re-
wards such as food or drink (Kringelbach, O’Doherty, 
Rolls, & Andrews, 2003; Rolls, 2000), as well as sym-
bolic rewards, such as money (Tom, Fox, Trepel, & Pol-
drack, 2007; Elliott, Newman, Longe, & William Dea-
kin, 2003; Knutson et al., 2003). Orbitofrontal cortex 
activity has also been linked to the evaluation of  the 
relative appropriateness of  one’s responses, activating 
both to receiving rewards and avoiding punishments 
(Cunningham, Mowrer, & Kesek, 2009; Kim, Shimojo, 
& O’Doherty, 2006). Specifically, activity in the me-
dial OFC is typically related to evaluations of  positive 
or rewarding information, whereas activity in the lat-
eral OFC is related to evaluations of  negative or pun-
ishing information (see Kringelbach & Rolls, 2004 for a 
review). Thus, while the amygdala and nucleus accum-
bens may provide information regarding expected out-
comes following the perception of  a stimulus, the OFC 
represents the current subjective evaluation. 
Because the OFC receives input from multiple sen-
sory modalities, it may play an important role in provid-
ing a common metric for representing and comparing 
disparate aspects of  evaluative information (Montague 
& Berns, 2002; Murray, O’Doherty, & Schoenbaum, 
2007; Rolls, 2000; Padoa-Schioppa & Assad, 2006; 
Wallis & Miller, 2003). Thus, the evaluative connota-
tion of  a friendship, a new car, or the ideals of  egalitar-
ianism can be reduced to a common evaluative dimen-
sion and directly compared across stimulus type. In this 
sense, whereas relatively more limbic regions may en-
code and retrieve objective S-R associations, the con-
version from attitude to subjective evaluation (which 
can vary as a function of  different contextual factors) 
may require the OFC. Specifically, activity in medial 
OFC is typically related to evaluations of  positive or re-
warding information, whereas activity in lateral OFC is 
related to evaluations of  negative or punishing informa-
tion (Anderson et al., 2003; Kringelbach & Rolls, 2004; 
O’Doherty et al., 2003; but see Northoffet al., 2000). 
To the extent that the amygdala and nucleus accum-
bens provide information regarding expected outcomes 
following the perception of  a stimulus, and the OFC 
represents the current state of  the organism, the dense 
reciprocal connections between amygdala and OFC al-
low for a comparison of  expected rewards and punish-
ments with current experience. Support for this idea 
comes from research demonstrating large OFC activa-
tions following violations of  expectancies (Nobre et al., 
1999) and the inability of  patients with OFC damage to 
update representations when predictions and outcomes 
are incongruent (Rolls et al., 2004; Fellows & Farah, 
2003). Thus, whereas subcortical systems provide a 
low–resolution estimate of  likely outcomes, regions of  
the OFC may be involved in integrating amygdala out-
put with current experience, allowing the current con-
text to play a role in shaping the evaluation (e.g., Blair, 
2004; Beer, Heery, Keltner, Scabini, & Knight, 2003; 
Rolls, 2000; Rolls, Hornak, Wade, & McGrath, 1994). 
 
Constructing More Elaborated Evaluations 
 
In many cases, the evaluation resulting from pro-
cessing in the amygdala and OFC will be sufficient to 
produce a behavioral response. In other cases, how-
ever, this joint processing may lead to conflict or uncer-
tainty about the stimulus or a predicted outcome. The 
presence of  conflict triggers anterior cingulate cortex ac-
tivation (see Bush, Luu, & Posner, 2000; Carter et al., 
1998), which may then signal the need for additional 
processing of  the stimulus in regions of  the lateral pre-
frontal cortex involved in cognitive control (see Bunge 
& Zelazo, 2006; MacDonald, Cohen, Stenger, & Carter, 
2000; Ridderinkhof, Ullsperger, Crone, & Nieuwenhuis, 
2004). This additional processing in the lateral prefron-
tal cortex allows for regulation of  affect in a top-down 
fashion by deliberately amplifying or suppressing the 
processing of  certain aspects of  the stimulus, changing 
the input to the system for subsequent processing. Re-
processing will likely modify the current evaluation by 
modulating activity in lower-order regions (e.g., Cun-
ningham, Johnson et al., 2004; Ochsner, Bunge, Gross, 
& Gabrieli, 2002; Ochsner et al., 2004). 
More complex networks of  processing allow for more 
complex construals of  a stimulus. This occurs because 
more information about a stimulus can be integrated 
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into the construal and because these networks support 
the formulation and use of  higher-order rules for delib-
erately selecting certain aspects of  a stimulus or context 
to which to attend (Bunge & Zelazo, 2006; Cunningham 
& Zelazo, 2007). The selection function of  prefrontal 
cortex may foreground specific aspects of  information 
(and background others). Further, prefrontal cortex may 
also play a role in keeping current goals and contextual 
demands/constraints in mind, which is important for 
fulfilling the competing goals of  minimizing error while 
minimizing processing load (e.g., Cunningham, Zelazo, 
Packer, & Van Bavel, 2007). This characterization of  
the prefrontal cortex is consistent with its hypothesized 
role in allowing for higher levels of  reflective conscious-
ness via reprocessing (Zelazo, 2004) and in the monitor-
ing and control of  cognition and behavior (e.g., Carver 
& Scheier, 2001; Shallice, 1982; Stuss & Benson, 1986). 
Taken together, the dynamic interactions among differ-
ent brain regions support a flexible and complex process 
of  evaluation that unfolds over time and exists on a con-
tinuum from relatively automatic (and simple) to rela-
tively reflective (and complex). 
 
Attitude Formation 
 
The goal of  an adaptive learning system is to develop 
appropriate and accurate estimates of  the future value 
of  certain stimuli. As such, attitudes reflect our previ-
ous experience with the environment and the learning 
that accompanies our ongoing positive and negative ex-
periences. To the extent that positive experiences accom-
pany the presence of  particular stimuli or following a 
particular behavior, a more positive attitude will develop 
(and negative attitudes will develop for negative experi-
ences). The next time that we encounter that same (or 
similar) situation, our evaluative system can infer that 
a similar positive (or negative) experience will occur. In 
general, attitudes that follow direct experience are likely 
to develop more quickly and result in stronger predic-
tions (Fazio & Zanna, 1981). 
The assumptions of  reinforcement conditioning can 
be best summarized by Thorndike’s law of  effect (1911), 
which states that an organism will be more likely to re-
peat actions associated with a reward, and less likely to 
repeat actions associated with a punishment or negative 
stimulus. Whereas classical conditioning establishes an 
evaluative association between one’s previous experi-
ences and the attitude object, instrumental conditioning 
forms associations between hedonic outcomes and the 
behavior that produced them. Furthermore, instrumen-
tal conditioning involves a fundamentally different set 
of  interactions between the cortical structures and neu-
rotransmitters comprising the instrumental response, 
which are discussed in detail below. 
The most well-known example of  both classical and 
instrumental conditioning is that of  fear conditioning 
(Watson & Rayner, 1920), and among the brain struc-
tures believed to be involved in fear conditioning, the 
amygdala has received the most attention (Davis, 1992; 
Adolphs, Tranel, Damasio, & Damasio, 1995; LeDoux, 
Cicchetti, Xagoraris, & Romanski, 1990). For example, 
during fMRI, the amygdala is active while learning eval-
uative contingencies (LaBar, Gatenby, Gore, LeDoux, 
& Phelps, 1998), and patients with amygdala lesions do 
not show fear conditioning (LaBar, LeDoux, Spencer, & 
Phelps, 1995). Although much of  the learning literature 
assigns the amygdala a critical role in fear conditioning, 
recent research has also demonstrated an important as-
sociation between the amygdala and the processing of  re-
ward-related and novel information (see Murray, 2007 
for a review). For example, studies of  appetitive condi-
tioning on rats with amygdala lesions have shown that 
the amygdala is necessary for learning some approach 
behaviors (Cardinal, Parkinson, Lachenal, et al., 2002; 
Everitt et al., 1999). The human amygdala exhibits a sim-
ilar pattern of  reward processing. Among hungry partici-
pants conditioned to associate a visual cue with the odor 
of  a pleasant-smelling food, the amygdala is more ac-
tive in response to seeing this conditioned visual stimulus 
than in participants whose hunger has been sated (Gott-
fried, O’Doherty, & Dolan, 2003). Taken together, these 
studies suggest that the amygdala plays an active role 
in conditioned responses regardless of  valence (Everitt, 
Cardinal, Hall, Parkinson, & Robbins, 2000). 
 
Beyond the Amygdala 
 
As in the attitude expression literature, it is a mistake 
to ascribe too much function to the amygdala. In partic-
ular, areas of  the striatum and prefrontal cortex also play 
important roles in reinforcement learning. One prom-
inent theory of  striatal contributions to reinforcement 
learning is that of  the actor/critic model (Sutton & Barto, 
1998; but see Khamassi et al., 2005), in which the ventral 
and dorsal striatum serve distinct functions in generating 
evaluative representations. According to this model, the 
ventral striatum plays the role of  the “critic,” generating 
predictions about the likely reward value of  a particular 
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stimulus. The ventral striatum updates representations to 
the extent that the prediction and the actual outcome dif-
fer (the temporal difference error), which is relayed to the 
dorsal striatum. This dorsal region (the “actor”) then pro-
cesses this information and makes certain stimulus-re-
sponse associations more or less likely, depending on the 
hedonic outcome previously experienced. 
To empirically test these roles for dorsal and ventral 
striatum in humans, O’Doherty and colleagues (2004) 
hypothesized that these regions would also show differ-
ences in activation in response to the amount of  control 
participants had in choosing a particular reward. Two 
groups were formed, one involving instrumental learn-
ing and the other classical learning. In the instrumen-
tal learning condition, participants were able to choose 
which stimuli they preferred based on expected value 
(i.e., the hedonic value of  the reward multiplied by the 
probability of  receiving it), while in the classical learn-
ing condition a computer chose the stimuli and the 
participants had to guess which stimulus was chosen. 
Ventral striatum activity was observed across both con-
ditions, consistent with its role in appraising predicted 
value. Dorsal striatum activity, on the other hand, was 
positively correlated with the prediction error signal dur-
ing instrumental conditioning. This result supports the 
hypothesis that this region serves in an “actor” role in 
exhibiting greater prediction-error-related activity when 
rewards are chosen during instrumental conditioning, as 
opposed to classical conditioning. 
Although the computations provided by the basal 
ganglia may appear sufficient for outcome reinforce-
ment learning, current neurobiologically constrained 
computational models of  reinforcement learning and 
decision-making indicate that the orbitofrontal cortex 
(OFC) plays a complementary role to the basal gan-
glia system (see Frank & Claus, 2006). Specifically, 
the OFC appears to be necessary for representing cur-
rent reward states (Knutson, Fong, Bennett, Adams, & 
Hommer, 2003; O’Doherty, Kringelbach, Rolls, Hor-
nak, & Andrews, 2001) and updating representations 
when stimulus contingencies change (Chudasama & 
Robbins, 2003; Fellows & Farah, 2003). As noted ear-
lier, the OFC may provide a representation of  reward 
magnitude currently being received, which can then be 
used to flexibly guide behavior and update representa-
tions in basal ganglia. That is, the computations of  he-
donic state from the OFC may provide a powerful in-
put to the comparison between predicted and received 
outcomes to generate prediction error signals. 
While conditioning forms a critical part of  the for-
mation of  attitudes, there are several instances where 
attitudes can form in the absence of  direct experience. 
For example, people can learn the evaluative associa-
tion of  a stimulus without any direct experience with 
the aversive stimulus per se (e.g., Bandura, 1977). Peo-
ple can learn by observing others’ responses, or by sim-
ply being told that something is good or bad, helpful 
or harmful. To illustrate this point, Phelps et al. (2001) 
verbally instructed participants that they would receive 
at least one shock during the course of  an fMRI exper-
iment when a particular stimulus was presented. Al-
though no shocks were ever received during scanning, 
the authors observed left amygdala activation when the 
threatening stimulus was presented. The verbally cre-
ated association between the stimulus and the poten-
tially aversive outcome was therefore sufficient to elicit 
an amygdala response. Evidence for the amygdala’s 
potential role in observational learning was provided 
in a follow-up study. Participants that simply watched 
someone else receiving shocks during a conditioning 
task had greater amygdala activated to the conditioned 
stimuli (Olsson, Nearing, & Phelps, 2007). Lastly, the 
social status of  a person has been shown to alter brain 
activity without direct experience. When playing a trust 
game, participants has less striatum activity to partners 
who were portrayed to be trustworthy or untrustworthy 
when compared to neutral partners (Delgado, Frank, & 
Phelps, 2005). This suggests that social knowledge may 
have the ability to supersede conditioned knowledge 
(and the conditioning process). 
Overall, these findings highlight an exciting array of  
possibilities for learning and attitude formation beyond 
simple classical conditioning. The ability to mentally 
empathize and learn from observation produces neural 
effects similar to those produced through classical con-
ditioning alone. We can dislike groups of  people who 
we have never met, have an aversion to new situations, 
or have abstract opinions for which we would be willing 
to die. For such attitudes, conditioning may only play a 
small part in the development and maintenance of  atti-
tude representations. 
 
Attitude Change 
 
Changing circumstances can necessitate the rever-
sal of  previously learned associations between stimuli 
and their hedonic value. This attitude reversal can occur 
when current evaluations are no longer useful, or when 
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they turn out to be harmful; for example, a positive eval-
uation toward a seemingly delicious piece of  food must 
update rapidly if  it induces vomiting once ingested. This 
will result in a more negative evaluation the next time 
that the food is encountered, suggesting that the attitude 
has changed. 
In exploring how this reversal learning occurs, how-
ever, it is useful to make a distinction between ingrained 
attitudes that are activated more automatically, and 
more flexible evaluations that can be reversed relatively 
quickly. This distinction has been categorized as an in-
teraction between the temporary, or short-term, and 
the permanent, or long-term, aspects of  attitude rever-
sal (Frank & Claus, 2006). Both are relative to the num-
ber of  interactions an organism has had with a certain 
stimulus or situation. In the case of  temporary attitude 
change, for example, updating and potential reversal of  
an attitude can occur from situation to situation, while 
in permanent or long-term attitude change, the rever-
sal occurs over several interactions that are contrary to a 
previously held attitude. 
Although we have focused thus far on the role of  the 
OFC in representing received rewards and helping to 
provide a reinforcement signal for learning, the OFC is 
also involved in the updating of  evaluative representa-
tions either because the representation is no longer ap-
propriate (e.g., extinction) or because the context or sit-
uation requires a different response (e.g., Blair, 2004; 
Beer, Heery, Keltner, Scabini, & Knight, 2003; Rolls, 
2000; Rolls, Hornak, Wade, & McGrath, 1994). One 
way that these processes can be achieved is by providing 
a complementary predictive reward signal to the basal 
ganglia that updates more rapidly. Whereas the basal 
ganglia learning systems slowly incorporate changes 
in reward contingencies across time and situation, the 
OFC can update more quickly, using recent experiences 
to guide an evaluative signal. While the OFC rapidly 
evaluates and processes sensory information (Kringel-
bach & Rolls, 2003, 2004), it is argued that this region is 
also critical in evaluating the associations between envi-
ronmental stimuli and reinforcement. 
Due to these properties, it is possible the OFC plays a 
key role in reversing or extinguishing previously learned 
behavior-reward associations (Rolls, 2000). Evidence 
supporting this hypothesis is illustrated by experiments 
looking at the effects of  learning and reversal in clini-
cal patients with lesions in these prefrontal areas. In 
one such study by Fellows and Farah (2003), evalua-
tive reversal was examined in patients with OFC lesions. 
Patients with either ventromedial OFC (vmOFC) or 
dorsolateral OFC (dlOFC) lesions performed a simple 
decision-making task where the reward and loss contin-
gencies of  two decks of  cards were reversed in the mid-
dle of  the experiment. While dlOFC lesion patients per-
formed equally to controls on the card game, vmOFC 
patients performed significantly worse following rever-
sal of  the contingencies of  the decks. For the worst per-
formers, maximal lesion overlap was observed in the left 
posteromedial orbitofrontal cortex. These results sug-
gest that attitude reversal, which requires rapid updat-
ing, recruits areas of  the vmOFC to make these behav-
ioral changes. 
Neuroimaging investigations examining these pre-
frontal regions have corroborated these results in 
healthy subjects, and have revealed an important dis-
tinction between the medial and lateral regions of  the 
OFC in influencing the behavioral response to reward-
ing and punishing outcomes. In an fMRI investigation 
by O’Doherty and colleagues (2001), two abstract frac-
tal representations were presented in which participants 
had to discover through trial and error which fractal was 
associated with greater gains over multiple trials. Select-
ing the correct fractal would display a monetary reward 
on the screen, while an incorrect choice would display 
the amount lost. The values of  the fractals were then 
switched partway through each trial block, and blood 
oxygen-level dependent (BOLD) activity was examined 
during this switch. Immediately after the reversal, me-
dial OFC activity was significantly associated with the 
BOLD signal following a rewarding stimulus (i.e., the 
actual receipt of  the reward), while lateral OFC activity 
showed a similar correlation following a punishing stim-
ulus. In both cases, activity in these OFC regions was 
correlated with the magnitude of  the reward or punish-
ment. Based on previous findings, the authors suggested 
that there are limited and weak connections between the 
medial and lateral OFC, while within each of  these re-
gions there exist several strong and robust neural con-
nections. Therefore, it is useful to categorize the medial 
and lateral OFC as separate structures contributing to 
the updating of  the relative hedonic values of  rewarding 
and punishing stimuli, respectively. 
While the OFC has been shown to play an impor-
tant role in rapidly updating and reversing attitudes, the 
basal ganglia, due to its role in forming habits and un-
conscious motor responses (Jog, Kubota, Connolly, Hil-
legaart, & Graybiel, 1999; Packard & McGaugh, 1996), 
is thought to be involved in updating attitudes and 
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evaluations over the long term, and is strongly modu-
lated by dopamine (DA; Gerfen, 2000). For example, 
increased DA during positive reinforcement leads to an 
increased probability for the action that produced the 
reinforcement (Frank & Claus, 2006; Houk, Adams, & 
Barto, 1995). The structure of  the dopamine pathway 
itself  supports this inference, as it projects to the basal 
ganglia and medial region of  the frontal cortex, expe-
riencing phasic increases in DA when events are better 
than expected, and phasic decreases in DA when events 
are worse than expected (Schultz, Dayan, & Montague, 
1997). Evidence for the basal ganglia’s role in habit for-
mation also comes from lesion studies showing that le-
sions to a specific part of  the striatum affect the learning 
of  habitual responses. For example, lesions to the dor-
solateral striatum in rats led to decreased habitual re-
sponding, and an increased sensitivity to reward cues 
when learning stimulus-response associations (Yin, Os-
tlund, Knowlton, & Belleine, 2005). 
Although the basal ganglia and OFC appear to rep-
resent two different modes of  learning and forming at-
titudes, we hypothesize that both are influenced by the 
same information and differ as a function of  their learn-
ing rates. The basal ganglia is influenced by all positive 
and negative events providing information about the rel-
ative hedonic value of  a particular stimulus or behav-
ior, leading to predictions about the reward outcome of  
a behavior over a relatively long period of  time (Jog et 
al., 1999). When these predictions are violated, as pos-
ited by the actor/critic model (O’Doherty et al., 2004), 
an updating of  representations takes place in order to re-
flect this new information. However, this process takes 
relatively longer than that of  the OFC, which is able to 
update its representations rapidly on a trial-to-trial basis. 
Eventually, then, the evaluations stored by the basal gan-
glia could become the basis for the relatively automatic 
representations held in working memory by the OFC, 
leading to these representations becoming the same in 
both areas, until additional information is encountered 
and processed by the basal ganglia. This model also pos-
sibly explains why, under cognitive load, the representa-
tion stored by the basal ganglia takes prominence. The 
OFC, which contains many of  the higher-order cogni-
tive areas required for nuanced and critical thinking, 
also requires significant cognitive resources to manip-
ulate any attitudes or representations in working mem-
ory. Thus, the more automatic and readily accessible at-
titudes of  the basal ganglia will tend to predominate in 
these cognitively demanding situations. 
Yet, not all attitudes can be represented as simple 
stimulus-evaluation or stimulus-response associations. 
As noted earlier, evaluations can be highly context de-
pendent and can sometimes lead to conflict, as when 
both positive and negative characteristics are associ-
ated with the attitude object, resulting in a state known 
as ambivalence (Cacioppo & Berntson, 1994). Thus, al-
though in most situations the OFC can help generate an 
unambiguous evaluation constrained by a situation, this 
sometimes fails, and more elaborate “higher-order” at-
titudes need to be developed to organize attitude repre-
sentations. That is, by deliberately weighting some infor-
mation more than others, individuals can form a more 
integrated evaluation. Unlike inhibition, which drives 
inconvenient information out of  mind, these integrated 
evaluations yield more complex activations, and may 
represent and account for inconsistencies. The evalua-
tions that result from this type of  processing are similar 
to what Petty and Cacioppo (1984) call an “elaborated 
attitude,” which is known to be relatively stable and re-
sistant to change. In this sense, these evaluations can be 
thought of  as “resolved ambivalence.” 
In terms of  the underlying brain systems for such a 
process, the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) has been 
shown to play a key role in modulating the activity of  
both of  these areas in attitude reversal. In particular, 
the ACC is involved in conflict monitoring and eval-
uating the appropriateness of  behavior in specific sit-
uations. Largely guided by contextual cues, the ACC 
assists in modifying behavior to maximize hedonic re-
ward (Bush, Luu, & Posner, 2000; Carter et al., 1998; 
Holroyd & Coles, 2002). The ACC is thought to sig-
nal the need for additional processing in areas of  the 
lateral prefrontal cortex that can reorganize repre-
sentations in a more abstracted form (Hazy, Frank, 
& O’Reilly, 2007; Rougier, Noelle, Braver, Cohen, & 
O’Reilly, 2005). Through repeated re-organization of  
the same information, a second-level representation 
can be generated that can be used for subsequent judg-
ments and behavior. 
 
Prejudice 
 
An early focus for the social neuroscience study of  
attitudes has been the domain of  prejudice. Initial stud-
ies demonstrated a role for the amygdala in the pro-
cessing of  other-race faces. Hart and colleagues (2000) 
demonstrated that, for White participants, amygdala 
220 C u n n i n g h A m ,  h A A s ,  & J A h n  i n  O x f O r d  H a n d b O O k  O f  S O c i a l  n e u rO S c i e n c e   (2011) 
activation to supraliminal Black faces habituated more 
slowly than White faces; the reverse pattern was found 
for Black participants. They concluded that all faces are 
processed immediately for their threat value, but that 
ingroup faces are deemed safe more quickly than out-
group faces. The role of  the amygdala in intergroup 
perception was further expanded upon by Phelps and 
colleagues (2000), who showed that greater amygdala 
activation to Black than White faces was correlated 
with an indirect measure of  race bias that reflects a 
preference for one race over the other — the Implicit 
Association Test (IAT; Greenwald et al., 1998). Inter-
estingly, for White participants, neither of  these stud-
ies showed greater overall amygdala activation to Black 
faces relative to White faces. 
One potential explanation for not finding the ex-
pected greater amygdala activation to Black than White 
faces is that control processes may inhibit or recon-
strue an activated emotional response. That is, higher-
level cognitive functions may moderate automatically 
activated attitudes. Thus, for participants viewing long 
blocks of  Black or White faces (as in Hart et al., 2000 
and Phelps et al., 2000), there is greater opportunity 
for control processes to dampen or attenuate any auto-
matic effects that would otherwise be observed. Consis-
tent with this hypothesis, Cunningham and colleagues 
(2004) found that the majority of  White participants 
had greater amygdala activation to Black than to White 
faces (which were randomly intermixed), but only when 
the faces were presented briefly and masked such that 
participants did not report seeing the faces. For faces 
that could be clearly seen and thus consciously pro-
cessed, decreased amygdala activation for Black relative 
to White faces was accompanied by activation in areas 
of  the PFC and the anterior cingulate gyrus — areas as-
sociated with cognitive control. 
Interestingly, it appears that mental activities that 
counteract prejudiced thoughts may diminish con-
trol in other situations. According to Baumeister, Brat-
slavsky, Muraven, and Tice (1998), self-regulation is a 
limited resource, and any act of  control not only uses 
up resources at the time of  control, but also for some 
time afterward while the system recuperates. Richeson 
and Shelton (2003) found that after non-prejudiced 
White participants interacted with a Black individual 
— a task that may require cognitive control for partic-
ipants who harbor prejudice but want to act or appear 
egalitarian — they subsequently performed worse on 
the Stroop task, a task that requires cognitive control 
for incompatible trials (e.g., reporting that the word 
green is in a red print color). In a follow-up fMRI study, 
Richeson and colleagues (2003) scanned White partic-
ipants while they viewed Black and White faces. Af-
terward, participants performed the Stroop task. As in 
Cunningham and colleagues (2004), greater activation 
was observed in the right lateral PFC while participants 
viewed Black compared with White faces. Further-
more, the degree of  right PFC activity while viewing 
Black faces during the fMRI task predicted subsequent 
Stroop performance, with those with the most right 
PFC activity during fMRI performing the worst on the 
Stroop task. Presumably, the cognitive cost of  control 
was manifested in the subsequent cognitive task. This 
pattern of  findings provides support for the idea that 
nonprejudiced participants attempt to regulate their 
emotional responses to Black faces. 
In light of  these findings (and the work dis- cussed 
earlier), the amygdala should not be considered a 
source of  prejudice, but as a component in a larger 
framework of  competing automatic and controlled pro-
cesses which modulate the expression of  prejudice. For 
example, Phelps, Cannistraci, and Cunningham (2003) 
reported on a patient who, despite bilateral amygdala 
damage, still showed evidence of  automatic race biases 
on an indirect mea- sure of  automatic associations, sug-
gesting that automatic evaluative responses are possible 
without an amygdala. This is consistent with the posi-
tion that the amygdala is better characterized as a re-
sponsive component to motivationally relevant stimuli, 
instead of  strictly negative, fearful, or threatening stim-
uli (Canli et al., 2005; Cunningham et al., 2004, 2008; 
Mather et al., 2004). 
In the processing of  social groups, and people or ob-
jects in general, other areas are associated with process-
ing emotional intensity and valence, notably, the right 
prefrontal and orbitofrontal cortex. While explicit acts 
of  hate and more overt forms of  discrimination are 
the most salient features of  prejudice, they often over-
shadow a complementary form of  prejudice in the form 
of  positive associations toward ingroup members. In-
deed, the history of  intergroup conflict provides strong 
evidence that “ingroup love” is a more common root 
of  discrimination than “outgroup hate” (Brewer, 1999). 
Moreover, in contexts where discrimination arises as a 
result of  differential evaluations of  two groups, ingroup 
bias can lead to the same patterns of  discrimination as 
outgroup derogation. Take, for example, racial discrim-
ination in the context of  a hiring decision: ingroup bias 
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and outgroup derogation would both lead a White can-
didate to be hired over a Black candidate. Although 
these decisions are the result of  different affective pro-
cesses, the result is identical — the candidates receive 
unequal levels of  treatment and discrimination ensues. 
Recent research has begun to examine the neural pro-
cesses involved in these ingroup and outgroup biases. 
In one study, participants were randomly assigned to a 
novel mixed-race team without a history of  contact or 
conflict with an outgroup team (Van Bavel, Packer, & 
Cunningham, 2008). Following assignment, participants 
spent three minutes memorizing the team member-
ship of  24 faces, and these faces were presented during 
fMRI scanning. Unlike previous research that has found 
greater amygdala activation to Black than White faces, 
this study found greater amygdala activation to team in-
group than outgroup faces, regardless of  race. Although 
this may seem counterintuitive if  one takes the view 
that the amygdala responds only (or primarily) to threat-
ening stimuli, it is consistent with the view that amyg-
dala activation reflects the processing of  the affective na-
ture of  motivationally significant stimuli (Anderson & 
Phelps, 2001; Cunningham et al., 2008). In many cases, 
negative or threatening stimuli take this role; however, 
in some situations positive stimuli can have greater mo-
tivational significance. The results from this study imply 
that, in the absence of  intergroup conflict and outgroup 
derogation, the ingroup may be motivationally primary 
(see also, Allport, 1954). This suggestion was bolstered 
by finding additional activations in reward processing 
regions, such as the striatum and orbitofrontal cortex, 
that show greater activation to ingroup than outgroup 
faces and that significantly correlated with self-reported 
preferences for ingroup (vs. outgroup) members. 
 
Political Attitudes 
 
As social neuroscience investigations have begun to 
inform our understanding of  basic social psychologi-
cal processes, researchers have started to apply these 
findings to improve our understanding of  political be-
havior. Although research in this area has typically fo-
cused on replicating previous evaluative effects in the 
domain of  political judgment (e.g., Kaplan, Freedman, 
& Iacoboni, 2007), other research has taken into consid-
eration that fact that the evaluation of  political candi-
dates differs from other evaluative categories in that peo-
ple rarely have direct exposure to the candidate, and the 
evaluation is often influenced by group membership and 
political ideology (Westen, Blagov, Harenski, Kilts, & 
Hamann, 2006). Though undecided voters may be rela-
tively more open to new information, once people have 
made a decision about which political candidate to sup-
port in an election they have a tendency to minimize the 
influence of  any new information that may be inconsis-
tent. For example, once one has decided to support can-
didate X, he or she may not want to learn about any in-
consistencies in candidate X’s statements. On this view, 
motivated reasoning helps to maintain attitudes in the 
face of  inconsistent information (e.g., Rahn, 1993), and 
as such, the study of  political attitudes may allow for a 
better understanding of  the motivational components of  
attitude acquisition, expression, and change. 
Although motivated reasoning often prevents attitude 
change, there are situations in which attitudes about 
political candidates may, and perhaps should, change. 
Voters who are uncertain, have weak or ambivalent at-
titudes, or those who are low on identification with 
a political party may be more likely to show attitude 
change in response to new information about a politi-
cal candidate (e.g., Lavine, 2001; Lodge & Taber, 2005; 
McGraw, Hasecke, & Conger, 2003). Unlike attitude 
change resulting from direct experience, attitude change 
here likely involves the integration of  new semantic in-
formation or inferred group membership to gener-
ate new attitudes. Thus, attitude change should be ex-
pected to require more prefrontal components that may 
serve to shape attitude representations. Consistent with 
this idea, when exposed to negative political advertising, 
participants who showed greater activation in the dor-
solateral prefrontal cortex also showed greater negative 
attitude change (Kato, et al., 2009). This pattern of  re-
sults supports the hypothesis that, unlike reversal learn-
ing in simple conditioning, attitude change for more ab-
stracted information like political attitudes may require 
a reorganization of  information mediated by the pre-
frontal cortex (O’Reilly, Noelle, Braver, & Cohen, 2002). 
Political evaluation is often considered to be a deliber-
ate act, where people weigh various options and develop 
a coherent political ideology. Yet, political ideology can 
also operate relatively automatically, coloring and shap-
ing our perceptions of  people and the information that 
they present. For instance, while people with low politi-
cal expertise may be more open to new information, peo-
ple with high political expertise and identification are 
more likely to interpret new information in terms of  au-
tomatically accessible schemas. Knutson, Wood, Spamp-
inato, and Grafman (2006) demonstrated that, in contrast 
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to people who were less politically involved, highly po-
litically identified participants had less lateral prefron-
tal cortex activity when responding to politically relevant 
stimuli. These data suggest that highly identified people 
engaged with particular information in a less deliberate 
fashion. As such, political experts may be able to rely on 
already established schemas to make quick evaluations, 
which may allow them to automatically interpret and in-
corporate consistent information into existing schemas. 
Political ideology can also function as a social iden-
tity and guide our perceptions of  others. For example, 
in one study participants were asked to think about the 
opinions and preferences of  a person who had a simi-
lar or dissimilar political affiliation (Mitchell, Macrae, & 
Banaji, 2006). It was assumed that participants who more 
strongly identified with a certain political party would 
process a similar-minded person as an ingroup member, 
and therefore activate brain areas that have been linked to 
self-referential processing. For example, liberals were ex-
pected to be able to understand the mental states of  an-
other liberal more than a conservative, and the converse 
was expected for conservatives. Considering the men-
tal state of  a similar other led to activity in ventral areas 
of  the medial prefrontal cortex (PFC), whereas consid-
ering the mental state of  a dissimilar other led to activ-
ity in more dorsal areas of  the medial PFC. Interestingly, 
individuals who strongly self-categorized with a political 
group, as measured by the IAT, had greater ventral me-
dial PFC activity to politically similar others and less dor-
sal medial PFC activity to dissimilar others. Because re-
gions of  the medial PFC have previously been implicated 
in building mental models of  other minds and simulat-
ing the thoughts and feelings of  other people (a process 
called mentalizing; Mitchell, 2006), with more ventral ar-
eas being more involved in the processing of  self-relevant 
information (Kelley et al., 2002), the authors concluded 
that although similar and dissimilar others both recruit 
regions involved in understanding others, similar others 
were more likely to be processed like the self. 
 
Summary 
 
Although understanding attitudes presents a consid-
erable challenge for scientists, there is a rich history of  
relevant theoretical ideas and findings from social and 
cognitive psychology and intriguing new findings from 
social cognitive neuroscience. Borrowing from the liter-
atures on reinforcement learning and affective process-
ing, we can appreciate the intricate neural systems that 
attitudes operate upon. Interestingly, many of  the same 
brain regions that are involved in expression, formation, 
and change appear to be identical, suggesting a unified 
set of  dynamic processes that can give rise to multiple 
attitudinal phenomena. As such, evaluation may reflect 
the current processing of  an integrated information pro-
cessing system at any given time. The particular ways 
in which information is constrained, weighed, and inte-
grated as evaluations are constructed online from atti-
tudes and the exact computations of  the various brain 
regions involved in these processes will require more in-
depth investigation. 
More importantly, much of  this research has exam-
ined relatively simple learning paradigms, or responses 
to relatively simple attitude stimuli (i.e., an aversive task, 
shock, or facial expression). Although attitudes can be 
formed under several of  these types of  situations, we 
have suggested that they are much more likely to be 
formed by a complex interaction of  social and contex-
tual factors. Using neuroimaging techniques, we are 
just beginning to uncover how different brain regions 
contribute to the formation and change of  attitudes, 
and particularly how these can be applied to impor-
tant social issues such as prejudice and political behav-
ior. A more thorough investigation of  the interplay be-
tween attitudes, the situation, and the mind is crucial for 
a deeper understanding of  attitudes, both whence they 
came from and where they are going. 
 
Note 
1. Although the NAcc is correlated with buying behavior, it is un-
clear from these fMRI studies whether this is the result of  the 
motivational dopaminergic “wanting” or the more hedonic 
opioid “liking” subdivisions of  the NAcc (Berridge, Robinson, 
& Aldridge, 2009). 
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